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Abstract
It is worth distinguishing social exclusion from social isolation, defining
social isolation as the phenomenon of non-participation (of an
individual or group) in a society’s mainstream institutions, while
reserving ‘social exclusion’ for the subset of cases in which social
isolation occurs for reasons that are beyond the control of those subject
to it. First, it is likely that different causal processes are at work
producing on one hand social exclusion and on the other the voluntary
social isolation of, for example, a religious community. Second, even if
there are reasons for concern about both voluntary and involuntary
social isolation, there are reasons for concern about social exclusion that
do not apply to voluntary social isolation.
The familiar form of social exclusion affects those who are unable
to participate in the institutions patronised by the majority. There is
also, however, exclusion of the majority by a minority who are in a
position to opt out of the mainstream institutions: the epitome of this is
the ‘gated community’. Social exclusion is a violation of the demands of
social justice in two ways: it conflicts with equality of opportunity and is
associated with an inability to participate effectively in politics. An
alternative account of what is wrong with social exclusion is that it
undermines social solidarity. Voluntary social isolation has the same
effect, but is less likely to have such adverse consequences. In particular,
the logic of competitive electoral politics is liable to lead to public
policies that discriminate against stigmatised minorities.
The relation between social exclusion and the distribution of
income is not the same in all societies because it depends on the extent
of commodification and the relative costs of public and private services.
However, for a society such as that of Britain, it seems plausible that to
avoid the social exclusion of a minority it is necessary for nobody to
have less than half the median income, and that to avoid the social
exclusion of the majority it is necessary for only a few to have more than
three times the median income.
‘Age Concern is increasingly concerned about poor
pensioners becoming excluded from society and the
widening gap between rich and poor. Already the top 10 per
cent live on £600 or more a week, nearly 10 times the weekly
income of the poorest 10 per cent. But while the basic state
pension remains linked to prices rather than earnings, this
gap is likely to widen, at least while half the adult
population make no private pension arrangements. Age
Concern says: “If the range of income, top to bottom, is
soaringly wide, then society loses cohesion. It becomes
impossible for everyone to mix on reasonably equal terms
and to have a sensible share of the normal accoutrements of
social life.” ’1
‘The most prominent policy trend of our time is the pulling
away of elite people from shared, publicly funded programs;
and as soon as programs get defined as ‘welfare’, they can be
gutted even further…  The United States faces a fork in the
road as the new century dawns. If conservatives (in both
major parties) have their way all of our tax and social
policies will soon be reconfigured to facilitate elite
separation from everyone else. We will have private,
market-based opulence for the top fifth, and more and more
private and public squalor for everyone else.’2
I What is Social Exclusion?
The thought is often expressed that ‘social exclusion’ is no more than a
relabelling of what used to be called ‘poverty’. However, although there
is no doubt a close association between economic stratification and the
phenomenon of exclusion within a society, it seems clear that in
principle social exclusion can occur between groups that are not
significantly distinguished from one another economically. Thus, while
the Jewish immigrants who came to Britain from eastern Europe were
poor to begin with, their descendants moved in large numbers over a
few generations into the professions and commerce. When I was
                                           
1 ‘Don’t Make Me Beg for a Decent Wage’, The Observer, 15 March 1998, p.16.
2 Theda Skocpol, ‘Toward a Popular Progressive Politics’, The Good Society,
7(3), Fall 1997, pp.22-3, quotation from p.23.
2growing up in the west London suburbs in the nineteen forties, the local
Jewish minority was neither perceptibly better nor worse off than the
average. Even so, the prevailing view in the rest of the community was
that Jews were ‘clannish’, and if they were this was no doubt a response
to the casual antisemitism to whose existence I can attest from
knowledge of the attitudes of my own relatives and neighbours.
The continuation of the story, however, suggests that social
exclusion tends to become attenuated and eventually disappear in the
absence of group economic inequality - unless a distinctive way of life
maintains social barriers. Unquestionably, Adolf Hitler made a grim
contribution (though this did not, I judge, really occur until after 1945)
by making the overt expression of antisemitic sentiments unfashionable.
But this could scarcely explain why the out-marriage rate among the
two-thirds of British Jews who are not Orthodox is currently running at
about fifty per cent, thus raising fears in some quarters for the
disappearance over a few more generations of a non-Orthodox Jewish
identity. At the same time, the Orthodox out-marriage rate is much
lower and this reflects the more general tendency for Orthodox Jews to
form distinct communities, including in some cases the maintenance of
separate religious schools.
Should this count as social exclusion? A parallel question can be
asked at the level of the individual. Is a recluse in good mental and
physical health with an average income to be regarded as socially
excluded? Let me approach this question by suggesting that we should
always look at apparently voluntary self-exclusion with some
scepticism. The evaluation of any voluntary act depends on the quality
of the choices on offer: that the action chosen appeared to the agent
preferable to the alternatives available at the time does not tell us much.
Thus, an individual or the members of a group may withdraw from
participation in the wider society in response to experience of hostility
and discrimination. Here, the actual withdrawal is voluntary but the
context within which it occurs still makes it a case of social exclusion,
understanding by this a process by which individuals or groups are
excluded against their will. Taken in context, the exclusion is no more
voluntary than is the departure from a job of somebody who resigns one
step ahead of the sack.
Suppose, however, that we are satisfied that we have a case of
genuine self-exclusion by an individual or a group. Shall we call this
social exclusion or not? The answer depends, I take it, on what we want
3to do with the concept. I believe that many people want the concept of
social exclusion to be defined in such a way that social exclusion is
always going to be a bad thing. But the idea of social exclusion as a bad
thing is itself one that is capable of bearing more than one
interpretation. Is the point supposed to be that social exclusion is
necessarily bad for the people excluded or would it be sufficient if it were
bad in some other way - for example, as a threat to social stability?3
I suspect that this question is rarely pressed because there is a
tendency to assume too readily that anything counting as social
exclusion under one conception will do so under the other as well.
Genuine self-exclusion challenges that identification if one believes that
it might in some circumstances be a good for the people who exclude
themselves but a bad from some more comprehensive viewpoint. For
what it is worth, the ESRC’s statement of the ‘thematic priority’ under
which CASE is funded appears to lean to the broader conception:
‘Understanding the processes by which individuals and their
communities become polarized, socially differentiated and unequal,
together with the rapid social changes that disrupt traditional forms of
social cohesion are of great concern and forms an urgent research
agenda.’4
A camel has been described as a horse designed by a committee.
Whatever committee designed this definition of social exclusion has
endowed it with even more protuberances, to the point at which it ends
in total grammatical collapse. However, what the committee appears to
mean is that the subjects of concern are polarization, social
differentiation and inequality. (The bits of the statement left over can
then be reassembled to say that understanding the processes by which
these phenomena come about constitutes a research agenda whose
urgency derives from the significance of the phenomena themselves.) It
is possible that the third item in the triad, ‘unequal’, is intended here as
a code word for ‘poor’. As it stands, however, the definition would
make a wealthy socially-differentiated group whose members were
quite happy to exclude themselves into a case of social exclusion.
It should be said, however, that such a broad conception of social
exclusion would not find support among the participants in CASE. At a
                                           
3 In certain cases, of course, it may be agreed that being excluded is bad for
those excluded but nevertheless that their exclusion is justifiable. An obvious
example would be those properly sentenced to a term in gaol.
4 Economic and Social Research Council, Thematic Priorities Update 1997.
4meeting early in 1998, something like a consensus emerged on the idea
that social exclusion should be construed as something that was done to
people rather than something they might choose to do themselves.
Thus, a proposed definition of social exclusion put forward by Julian Le
Grand began as follows: ‘A (British) individual is socially excluded if (a)
he/she is geographically resident in the United Kingdom but (b) for
reasons beyond his or her control, he/she cannot participate in the
normal activities of United Kingdom citizens, and (c) he/she would like
to so participate.’5
I want to postpone until sections III and IV the question of what is
wrong with social exclusion. However, it is possible to say here that,
whatever the answer to that question may be, voluntary and
involuntary social exclusion are at any rate sufficiently different to be
worth distinguishing conceptually. We may wish to conclude that there
is nothing wrong with voluntary social exclusion. But even if we do not
do that, we may very well still conclude that the cause for concern about
the self-exclusion of individuals or groups is not the same as the cause
for concern about exclusion that arises from processes over which the
individual or group has no control. I shall therefore follow the Le Grand
formulation and define social exclusion so that only involuntary
exclusion counts. However, the broader phenomenon pointed to by the
ESRC - a lack of social cohesion, whatever its sources - should also be
recognized. I propose to use the term ‘social isolation’ for it, on the
understanding that groups can be isolated from the rest of society as
well as individuals.
Social isolation is thus defined so that it may be either voluntary
or involuntary. In other words, social isolation encompasses social
exclusion but is not confined to it. Needless to say, social isolation (in
both of its forms) is to be conceived of as a variable: an individual or
group is not simply socially isolated or not but is rather more or less
socially isolated. One of the objectives of further work must be, indeed,
to establish the various dimensions among which social isolation is to be
measured.
There is one unresolved conceptual question left by what has been
said so far. Although it may seem at first sight a rather fine-drawn issue,
it actually goes to the heart of what is wrong with social exclusion. Let
us imagine a group whose members choose to be socially isolated, but
                                           
5 Julian Le Grand, ‘Possible Definition of Social Exclusion’, paper circulated at
CASE meeting at Cumberland Lodge, 5th and 6th January 1998.
5now add that they would be unable to break out of social isolation (for
whatever reason) even if they wanted to. Clearly, the social isolation of
this group is overdetermined. But does this entail that it does not suffer
from social exclusion? Recall the definition put forward by Julian Le
Grand from which I quoted above. According to this, a British
individual would count as socially excluded on the basis of inability to
‘participate in the normal activities of United Kingdom citizens’, but
only with the proviso that ‘he/she would like to so participate’. This
definition has the implication that our group cannot be said to be
socially excluded, even though it meets the condition that its members
are unable to participate for reasons (as Le Grand specifies) beyond their
control. I am not happy about this, for reasons that I shall explain.
One reason for having qualms about the result has already been
raised: the difficulty in determining that the self-exclusion is truly
voluntary where it is apparent that attempts to integrate would be
rebuffed. But I think the objection would survive the satisfactory
resolution of that difficulty. If you would be refused membership in a
club on the basis of your religion, race, ethnicity or sex, common sense
suggests that you are excluded, in the sense that you are subject to an
exclusionary policy. Even if you claim - turning (Groucho) Marx on his
head - that you would not want to belong to any club that would not let
you in, that does not alter the fact of exclusion.
From the most narrowly-conceived utilitarian point of view, being
prevented by forces beyond your control from doing something you do
not want to do anyway has no moral significance. (The only reason why
it might be thought to matter is that you could change your mind later.)
But this fails to recognize the legitimate complaint that, say, blacks have
when confronted with a ‘whites only’ restaurant or hotel even if they
have no wish to avail themselves of their services. I therefore posit that
individuals or groups are socially excluded if they are denied the
opportunity of participation, whether they actually desire to participate
or not.
Of the three elements in the ESRC’s conception of social exclusion
(which I have now relabelled social isolation), I have pulled out
polarization and social differentiation. The omission of the third,
inequality, is deliberate.  For inequality is, as I have argued, a
conceptually distinct phenomenon. The relation between social isolation
and inequality should be a possible topic for investigation, but it cannot
be if the concept of social isolation is defined so that inequality is an
6aspect of it. Two groups - for example Flemings and Walloons in
Belgium - can be roughly equal in power or status while at the same
time being polarized and socially differentiated. Conversely, a
community (especially one of a traditional kind) could be socially
integrated but still be marked by quite large inequalities of power and
status.
What of material inequality? I have already argued that a group
may be socially isolated (voluntarily or involuntarily) in the absence of
any distinctive profile among its members. If inequality is not a
necessary condition of social isolation, is it a sufficient condition?
William Julius Wilson suggests that it is: ‘The more unequal the
distribution of scarce resources among groups in a society, the more
differentiation there is in group social participation in the institutions of
society and in group culture.’6 This seems right, but it is important to
emphasize that ‘scarce resources’ need to be understood here very
broadly, and not simply identified with personal income after taxes and
transfers.
We cannot treat money income as a proxy for command over
scarce resources because the effects of any given degree of inequality in
money incomes will be mediated through the workings of social,
economic and political institutions. The same spread between the
amounts of money in the pockets of different people may have different
implications for social isolation depending on, roughly speaking, the
degree to which overall opportunities to do things and get things reflect
the possession of money. Suppose we take the set of institutional
arrangements in a society as given. Then it should be possible to
hypothesize a connection between the distribution of income and the
degree of social isolation. But this still leaves inequality and social
isolation as distinct concepts. Failure to maintain this distinction would
make it impossible to ask precisely the kinds of question I want to ask
here.
II Stratified Social Exclusion: The two thresholds
It will scarcely have escaped notice that what was said earlier about the
experience of Jewish immigrants to Britain has some bearing on
Commonwealth immigration in the postwar period. I know only
                                           
6 William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass
and public policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p.136.
7enough about this subject to be aware that all generalizations are
foolhardy. However, there still seem to me to be two points worth
saving from the discussion in section I. The first is that ‘voluntary’
withdrawal into the comforts of the community is a characteristic
response to the experience of hostility and discrimination. The second is
that, even where social exclusion has its roots in religious, ethnic or
‘racial’ differences, the achievement of educational, occupational and
economic parity between groups is an important counteracting force.7
Important as these questions are, however, they are not the focus
of this paper. My purpose in touching on them at all is simply to
provide the background for my own inquiry by showing how it fits into
the wider picture of social isolation. What I am primarily concerned
with is the relation between inequality and social isolation. My two
opening quotations suggest in broad outlines the ways in which the two
are connected. Thus, the quotation from Age Concern posits a relation
between poverty and social isolation in as far as, beyond some point,
lack of money makes it ‘impossible for everyone to mix on reasonably
equal terms’. Since this means that there are many interactions from
which pensioners are excluded involuntarily as a result of poverty, this
clearly constitutes social exclusion.
My second quotation, from the American sociologist Theda
Skocpol, brings in another way in which inequality is relevant to social
isolation. If the wealthiest fraction of a society feel that they can afford
to insulate themselves from the common fate and buy their way out of
the common institutions, that is also a form of social isolation. Is it also a
form of social exclusion? It seems to me that it is. While it may be said
that the very rich have the opportunity to exclude themselves from
common institutions, what has to be added is that their wealth enables
them to erect barriers that keep out their fellow citizens. Hence, the
situation is one in which a minority is in a position to exclude the
majority.
It must be admitted that social exclusion is conventionally thought
of as something that happens to a minority. But I can see no good reason
for limiting its scope in this way. Surely, the South African apartheid
                                           
7 Compare William Julius Wilson’s argument, in relation to the United States,
that ‘sentiments for integration and interracialism tend to emerge when the
struggle against racial inequality appears hopeful’. Conversely, ‘sentiments
for racial separation and racial solidarity tend to emerge when minority race
members perceive the struggle against inequality as hopeless… ’ (ibid., p.127).
8regime could be described as (among other things) one in which a
twenty per cent minority of whites excluded the rest of the population
from access to the most significant educational, occupational and
political positions.
Everyday linguistic usage supports the claim that social exclusion
can be the lot of a substantial majority. An exclusive club is one that is
highly selective in admitting members, an exclusive resort is one that
few can afford to stay in, an exclusive neighbourhood is one that few
people can aspire to live in, an exclusive school or clinic is one that few
can attend, and so on. Indeed, the social exclusion of the majority might
be seen as acquiring physical shape in the so-called gated communities
that have multiplied in the United States during the past twenty years. It
is hard to imagine a more concrete embodiment of the social segregation
of the elite than a residential area which can be entered only by the
inhabitants and their invited guests, all others being turned away at
checkpoints by armed guards.
Of course, a necessary precondition for the creation of a gated
community is the existence of a large homogeneous neighbourhood:
there is no point in barring the gates if some of the barbarians are
already inside them. But the American genius for finding ways in which
money can be used as a social sifting device has already done this all
over the country. The cliché that the United States has more social
equality than Europe probably is - and certainly in the past was - true if
by that we mean that Americans in different educational and
occupational positions in the status hierarchy are less differentiated by
accent, bearing, mode of address, clothing, leisure activities, and so on.
Yet at the same time, despite this or perhaps even because of it, there is
an enormous desire to control the forms of association so as the create
homogeneous shopping centres, eating places, schools, medical
facilities, and so on.
The key to all this is, of course, location. The homogeneous
housing tracts required to make gated communities attractive to the
inmates have been deliberately created by public authorities, using their
zoning powers to decree that whole areas must contain only single-
family housing on large minimum-sized lots. Even in the absence of
formal barriers, the local police understand that their primary duty is to
keep a watch out for interlopers. I can provide some anecdotal evidence
for this, drawn from my experiences when renting a house in just such a
suburb of Pittsburgh about thirty years ago - a time, it is necessary to
9point out - before jogging came in. My habit of walking around on roads
dedicated to the internal combustion engine (no pavements, needless to
say) was sufficiently out of line with local norms to result in my being
more often than not discreetly shadowed by a patrol car. I was, I may
add, never challenged to prove my bona fides by the police, but I
attribute this to my finishing up at a house containing a manifestly
wholesome and regular wife and small child.
What all this suggests is that a society marked by a combination of
a market economy and liberal democratic institutions is liable to have
two thresholds of social exclusion. The lower one divides those who
habitually participate in the mainstream institutions from those who are
outside them. The upper threshold is the one that divides those in the
middle from those who can detach themselves from the mainstream
institutions. Looking to the USA, where both thresholds are more
sharply defined than in Britain, we see that in a curious way those
below the lower threshold and those above the upper one are a mirror
image of one another. Thus, the inhabitants of the inner city ghettoes
receive little police protection; the inhabitants of gated communities
need little because they employ their own security guards. As in Britain,
there are those who make little contact with the publicly funded schools
as a result of truancy and early dropping out; there are also those who
make little contact because they attend private schools. Those at the
bottom do not take part in ordinary democratic politics (even to the
extent of voting); those at the top do not need to because they can gain
direct access to decision-makers by contributing financially to Political
Action Committees and other lobbying organizations. Health care in the
USA has a lower threshold that excludes about twenty per cent of the
population from the sort of treatment available to others, but there is no
clear upper threshold because the rest get whatever they (or their
insurers) are willing to pay for. Conversely, Britain has no lower
threshold but an upper one defined by possession of private insurance.
The deterioration of the National Health Service would lead to the
extension of private or occupational insurance and a closer
approximation to the American situation.
The United States is further along the road of social exclusion than
Britain, to a large extent because its system of financing public services
results in their quality in each area reflecting far more directly the level
of prosperity in that area. The effect is that, even when the wealthy do
use public services, this is still a form of social exclusion because these
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services are for their exclusive use and thus create no sense of common
fate with those living in less wealthy areas. For example, Henry
Huntington arranged for a small municipality to be carved out in the
area surrounding his estate in a then undeveloped part of what is now
Greater Los Angeles.  This area, the City of San Marino, has from the
start contained only large and expensive houses. This enables the city to
provide excellent services, including high quality public education. But
this kind of collective provision among the rich is a phenomenon that
connects with the ‘theory of clubs’ rather than with any conception of
the universal entitlement of the citizens of a country to share in a
common system of public services.8
Nevertheless, neither Britain nor the United States is, in
geographical or historical perspective, an extreme example. Every
country in Latin America (to mention only one part of the world) has
both lower and upper thresholds that create far more differentiation in
life chances (including life expectancy), in actual ways of life, and in
relation to the major institutions. Similarly, when Disraeli wrote in 1845
of ‘two nations’, it was certainly more true than it is now that there was
‘no intercourse and no sympathy’ between the rich and the poor and
that they enjoyed, as he claimed, different breeding, different food,
different manners and different laws.9 (Disraeli, incidentally, omitted for
his own political purposes those in the middle: in my terms, ‘the rich
and the poor’ who made up his ‘two nations’ were those above the
upper threshold and those below the lower.) However, if we focus on
the subset of societies that are liberal democracies, the United States and
Britain will appear as being marked by a relatively large amount of
stratified social exclusion.  This matters because, when we ask what is
wrong with social exclusion, we may conclude that in some respects it
depends on the nature of the society within which it occurs.
III What’s Wrong with Social Exclusion? (1): Social
exclusion and social justice
                                           
8 For a discussion of the relation between the ‘theory of clubs’ and social
exclusion, see Bill Jordan, A Theory of Poverty and Social Exclusion (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1996), esp. pp.62-9.
9 Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil or the Two Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
The World’s Classics, 1981), pp.65-6 (originally published in 1845).
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As the last remark suggests, there are two possible ways of tackling the
question: ‘What’s wrong with social exclusion?’ One is to ask what is
wrong with it in general terms and the other is to ask what is wrong
with it in Britain, or in countries similar to Britain in the relevant
respects. (That, of course, entails a determination of the respects that are
relevant.) Many of the things that are wrong with social exclusion are
wrong with it everywhere. Most of the forms taken by social exclusion
in contemporary Brazil or early Victorian Britain are simply bad in a
more egregious way than the forms taken by it in contemporary Britain.
However, we should be prepared to consider ways in which social
exclusion (and perhaps also voluntary social isolation) run into special
objections in market-orientated liberal democratic societies.
I shall set out the case against social exclusion under two main
heads, discussing in passing how far the case extends to voluntary social
isolation. The first count against social exclusion is that it violates the
value of social justice. The second is that it violates the value of social
solidarity.  I shall take up the first in this section and the other in the
next.
Let me begin, then with the argument from social justice. It need
hardly be said that the concept of social justice is controversial. I shall
resist the temptation to articulate the main grounds of dispute and
develop my own theory. Instead, I shall put forward a minimal
conception of social justice that is nevertheless sufficiently rich to
explain why social exclusion is unjust. This is a conception of social
justice as equality of opportunity. It is not, of course, wholly
uncontroversial. But it is one to which all three major political parties in
Britain at least pay lip service, even if they are not prepared to endorse
its practical implications. It has, moreover, a good deal of intuitive
plausibility, because it makes room for individual human agency to
make a difference to legitimate claims, while at the same time
maintaining that brute bad luck - disadvantages for which people
cannot reasonably be hold responsible - should give rise to legitimate
claims for aid, redress or compensation (as appropriate).
One of the reasons for persistent disagreement about the
implications of equal opportunity is that it is not straightforward where
the boundaries lie between on one hand the things for which people can
properly claim the credit (and hence the associated rewards) or be
assigned the onus (and hence the associated losses or penalties) and on
the other hand those that are to count as a matter of good or bad
12
fortune. One particular bone of contention is on which side of the
boundary natural endowments fall. I myself believe that the only
coherent answer is that they are a matter of good or bad luck. However,
in order to move forward on as narrow a front as possible, I shall not
press that claim. The upshot if we drop natural endowments from the
sphere of luck is, roughly speaking, as follows: the principle of justice as
equal opportunity holds that people who are equally able (in terms of
native talent) should do equally well, unless they make voluntary
choices that result in their faring differently. To illustrate the force of the
second clause, imagine two people who graduate with a qualification in
law of exactly equal quality. If one opts for a high-pressure career while
the other prefers a job that leaves a lot of time for playing golf and
gardening, it is not unfair according to the principle of justice as equal
opportunity if one makes more money than the other, because both
faced the same set of options.10
It is apparent that no contemporary society comes very close to
implementing fully the principle of justice as equal opportunity. At the
same time, it can be said that, while there is some variation among
them, all contemporary liberal democracies do quite well by historical
and contemporary standards. This is scarcely accidental, since only a
tiny minority of societies in the history of the world have ever accepted
equality of opportunity as an aspiration. So long as the notion of justice
as equal opportunity functions as a touchstone for public policy, there is
at least some chance that a demonstration of failure to achieve it in a
certain area will have some long-term political impact.
Social exclusion conflicts with equal opportunity in at least the
following two ways: first, social exclusion leads to unequal educational
and occupational opportunities; and second, social exclusion actually
constitutes a denial of equal opportunity in relation to politics. I shall
take these points up in turn. Both thresholds of social exclusion come
into play in creating unequal educational and occupational opportunity.
Below the lower threshold, there are socially isolated areas in the inner
cities (especially in the USA) and large housing estates that are
geographically as well as socially isolated (especially in Britain). In some
                                           
10 Julian Le Grand expresses the same idea in terms of the concept of equity.
Thus, he writes that ‘a distribution is equitable if it is the outcome of
informed individuals choosing over equal choice sets’. Julian Le Grand,
Equity and Choice (London: Harper Collins, 1991), p.87 (emphasis
suppressed).
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of these areas, very few people are engaged in full-time permanent legal
employment, and the result is that the usual word-of-mouth flow of
information about job opportunities is almost entirely lacking. What
William Julius Wilson says of the American inner city applies to all such
situations:
‘Inner-city social isolation makes it much more difficult for
those who are looking for jobs to be tied into the job
network. Even… where job vacancies become available in an
industry near or within and inner-city neighbourhood,
workers who live outside the inner city may find out about
these vacancies sooner than those who live near the industry
because the latter are not tied into the job network.’11
Lack of job opportunities among the adults in an area tends to depress
scholastic motivation and thus contributes to poor educational
outcomes that condemn the next generation to extremely limited job
opportunities in their turn. Even if it were said that truancy or lack of
effort are ‘chosen’ by children, the environment in which such choices
are made is far too compromised for them to be assimilated to the choice
of the leisure-loving lawyer. Rather, they are themselves part of a self-
reproducing process of unequal opportunity.
Of course, poverty is in itself a barrier to equal educational
opportunity. A hungry or malnourished child is unlikely to be good at
concentrating on school work. The lack of a quiet room in which to
study at home (and, increasingly, a computer) makes homework
unattractive and difficult.  Also, to repeat a point made earlier, the more
closely the resources of a school district reflect its tax base, the more
underfunded schools in poor areas will be.  However, the concern here
is not with unequal educational opportunity in general but specifically
with the role played by social exclusion in it. And here it is the social
homogeneity of schools created by social exclusion that is significant.
An abundance of research suggests that children with middle class
attitudes and aspirations constitute a resource for the rest. A school
without a critical mass of such children therefore fails to provide
equality of educational opportunity to its pupils.
The social homogenization of schools is greatly increased by the
withdrawal of wealthy parents from the state system. Above the upper
threshold of social exclusion, the same people live, work, play and
marry together, and the perpetuation of privilege is smoothed by the
                                           
11 Wilson, p.60.
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public school/Oxbridge connection. In stark contrast to the lack of a
network providing access to ordinary jobs that afflicts those at the
bottom, those at the top are automatically enrolled in a network that
offers inside information about and access to the most desirable and
lucrative jobs that the society has to offer. Thus, equality of opportunity
is eroded from both ends: some have too few opportunities, others too
many.
So far I have been looking at ways in which social exclusion leads
to a violation of the demands of social justice as equal opportunity. I
now want to suggest that social exclusion can in some circumstances
actually constitute a denial of social justice. The line of argument here
starts from the familiar idea that there are some rights whose enjoyment
is unconditional, for example the right to a fair trial. Others, like the
right to vote, are dependent on status (generally, it is necessary to be an
adult citizen), but it is not necessary to have done anything especially
meritorious to enjoy them. The right to vote can be lost as a result of
being convicted of a sufficiently serious crime but is in other respects
universal. So is, in principle, the right to participate more broadly in
politics.
As before, it can be pointed out that inequality may have a direct
effect on the ability to exercise such rights. The opportunity to get a fair
trial is closed to those who cannot afford high quality legal
representation in the absence of a well-funded system of legal aid.
Similarly, it is scarcely necessary to point out the many ways in which
opportunities for disproportionate political influence flow directly from
the ability to make large financial contributions and from possession of
other resources such as ownership of media of mass communication.
Once again, however, my concern here is with the more limited
question of the relation of social exclusion to social justice.
Let me pursue this question by focusing on political participation.
It is surely not controversial that liberal democracies can fulfil the
promises that they hold out to their citizens only if the opportunity to
engage in political activity extends beyond the mere right to vote once
every four or five years. This must include the ability (not formally but
really) to take part in the work of political parties and other
organizations concerned with public policy, to take part in lobbying and
consult with local councillors or MPs, and so on. The inability to engage
in these activities is an aspect of social exclusion, so here social
exclusion is in itself a form of social injustice in that it is a denial of
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opportunities that should be open to all. Clearly, genuine opportunity to
engage in politics on equal terms has certain material preconditions.
Such preconditions are not met, for example, in the case of an
unemployed single mother on an out-of-town housing estate who
cannot afford costs of political activity such as babysitting, transport and
meals out.
There is a link between exclusion from politics and other kinds of
social exclusion in that political networks tend to grow out of social
networks. This is especially important for the workings of block
associations and community associations or the kind of informal
organization that forms to obtain, say, a controlled crossing between a
school and a housing estate. To the extent that the interests of the
socially excluded are congruent with those of the socially active in
relation to these matters, the outcomes may not be any different from
those that would have come about if they had participated. But we
cannot safely assume that the interests of the socially excluded are not
distinct, even in neighbourhood politics. And in any case, the point that
de facto first and second class citizenship is in itself objectionable, even if
it does not affect outcomes.
The best study I know of the relation between social networks and
political efficacy is that carried out by Jane Mansbridge in a Vermont
town that she called Selby.12 ‘Town’ is a political designation : the town
of Selby consisted of a village and outlying areas. The town
administration (elected at a meeting once a year) is not in the habit of
sending out written communications to residents, and individual
candidates (there are no parties) are equally unforthcoming. This creates
a systemic division between insiders and outsiders. ‘Itinerant town
criers like the mailman and the garbageman bring the news to the
people back in the hills only sporadically, while villagers hear it every
day…  Villagers say of a local political question that they “discussed it
down at the store”. Villagers do not make appointments with town
officials; they just “run into them down at the store”.’ Thus, ‘a part-time
farmer who holds a small town office [and lives up a back road]
complains that: “There’s too much that goes on before town meeting
that we don’t know about unless we’re part of it. They’re slack in
presenting all the information you need to function properly.”’13
                                           
12 Jane J Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (New York: Basic Books,
1980), p.103.
13 Ibid.
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Although New England ‘town’ politics are not exactly like the
politics of neighbourhood organizations and the like, because the ‘town’
decides on issues such as schools and roads, the phenomenon of
insiders and outsiders is a familiar one. Indeed, party politics at local
level is often an outgrowth of social networks. The main difference is
that in Selby a good deal could be done to foster wider participation
without any change in social relations. (The problem is that those who
run the existing system has no incentive to introduce more formal and
open procedures.) In more inherently informal politics, by contrast,
there is less scope for weakening the link between location on a social
network and political efficacy. Preventing social exclusion is therefore
the only route to the prevention of political exclusion.
IV What’s Wrong with Social Exclusion? (2): Social
exclusion and social solidarity
The conception of social justice utilized in this paper is sensitive to
individual choices. Because of this, social injustice is connected to social
exclusion as against the broader phenomenon of social isolation. Even
where voluntary separation from the wider society leads to diminished
job opportunities, this still does not involve a denial of social justice,
because the restricted opportunities themselves arise from a situation
that itself came about as a result of choice.14 Similarly, voluntary
withdrawal from political participation (arising, for example, from
religious beliefs) does not constitute social injustice, because all that is
required is an opportunity to participate.
In this respect, social justice and social solidarity are differently
related to social exclusion. For social solidarity is, as we shall see,
undermined by social isolation, whether it takes a voluntary or an
involuntary form, though (as I shall suggest below) its ill-effects may
well be more serious when the social isolation takes the form of social
exclusion. By social solidarity I mean a sense of fellow-feeling that
extends beyond people with whom one is in personal contact. At the
minimum, it is the acceptance that strangers are still human beings, with
                                           
14 Left unresolved by the assertion in the text are cases in which the choices of
adults (e.g. to send their children to a separate school that provides a poor
education or gives instruction in a minority language) restrict the subsequent
opportunities of the children. I shall deal with this difficult question in
Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, forthcoming).
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the same basic needs and rights; at the maximum, it is (in Benedict
Anderson’s terms) an ‘imagined community’.
It is undeniable that social solidarity exists, and also that it is more
or less strong in different times and places. This suggests that it has
social causes, and the connection that I want to make with the absence
of social isolation is that a significant factor in strengthening and
solidarity is the experience of common institutions and more generally
shared experiences. Thus, anyone who lived through the Second World
War will be able to attest to the immense increase in social solidarity
that occurred in that period. The most plausible explanation is that the
shared risks created by the Blitz gave large parts of the civilian
population a sense of shared vulnerability to random events, while the
army and the evacuation of children from the cities brought together
people who would not otherwise ever have been on intimate terms. The
universalization of social provision also originated in response to
wartime conditions. ‘Thus it was believed in 1939 for example, that only
the poor would need government aid if their homes were bombed, and
the rest could look after themselves; the responsibility for the bombed-
out was therefore laid on the Assistance Committees. Naturally the
belief and the arrangements both disintegrated with the first heavy raid
on London.’15
An alternative explanation that might be offered is the unifying
effect of a common enemy. But there are reasons for thinking that the
importance of this can easily be exaggerated. The First World War also
provided a common enemy, and indeed far greater hysteria about the
‘Hun’ was whipped up in the press and the politicians than against the
real evils of Nazism. Yet there was very little discernible development of
a sense of social solidarity. The elections following each war are
instructive in this regard: in 1918, the coalition that had fought the war
was rewarded with victory, largely on an externally-orientated platform
of vindictiveness towards the defeated powers; in 1945, the
Conservatives who had had a majority were thrown out, and a Labour
government elected on an almost entirely domestic platform of social
and economic reforms. The reason for the difference is, I suggest, that in
the First World War, the lives of the civilian population was very little
affected (zeppelin raids were an insignificant threat) while the
experience of the soldiers in the trenches was so far out of line with the
                                           
15 Anthony Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape, rev. ed.
1965 [1956]), p.98.
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propaganda fed to civilians that it actually opened up an unbridgeable
gulf between them.
There is another reason for thinking that the heightened sense of
social solidarity during the Second World War was not solely (or even
mainly) created by a common enemy. If that were so, we would expect
the sense of solidarity to disappear when the enemy was defeated. But
(as the point about the 1945 election illustrates), it survived in a
gradually attenuating form. We would, of course, expect such an
attenuation as those who were exposed to the experience of the Second
World War died and were replaced by others who had not.
Conversely, the whole course of public policy in Britain in the past
twenty years (and I see no sign of it changing) has tended to undermine
solidarity. Thus, to return to the opening quotation from Age Concern,
by decoupling benefit and pension levels from incomes and increasing
them only in line with inflation, the government has ensured that a large
proportion of the population are subsisting at much less than the level
at which social integration is a possibility. Competition for shares of
fixed and inadequate resources has been deliberately imposed on
institutions such as schools and universities whose lifeblood should be
cooperation. The decline of standards in public health care and
education have led to an increased desire to opt out, while a
phenomenal increase in the ratio of the incomes of the top ten per cent
of the population to the median has made it possible. Private provision
of security has been a growth industry.
Why should we care about social solidarity? I shall offer two
answers, one of which makes it intrinsically valuable while the other
makes it instrumentally valuable. In saying that social solidarity is
intrinsically valuable, I do not wish to be taken to mean that we are
dealing with something whose value somehow transcends its value to
individual human beings. Rather, all that is intended is that human lives
tend to go better in a society whose members share some kind of
existence. Aristotle said that to live outside society one would have to be
either a beast or a god, and we would not altogether missing the spirit of
that remark if we were to identify those below the lower threshold with
the beasts and those above the upper threshold with the gods: one
group lack the capacity to participate in the common institutions while
the other group have no need to. This, it may be argued, is not good for
the characters of those in either group.
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The theme could clearly be developed much further, but I hope I
have sketched in the way in which that development might be carried
through. Let me now then turn to the alternative, instrumental
argument for the significance of social solidarity. In essence, the
argument is that - especially in liberal democratic societies - social
justice is more likely to be realized through politics the higher the level
of social solidarity that there is in the society.
The connection suggested here between social exclusion (or more
broadly social isolation) and the denial of social justice is different from
that discussed in the previous section. Nevertheless, there is an
interaction between them. Thus, I argued that an aspect of social
exclusion is inability to participate as equals in politics. This obviously
reduces the relative political influence of groups below the lower
threshold of social exclusion. Suppose, however, that lack of resources
did not prevent them from punching below their weight, in relation to
their numbers. Their distinctive interests would still tend to be
neglected as a result of social isolation.
The reason for this is that, even if everybody in a polity had equal
power, there would still be winners and losers. Who wins and who loses
depends on the alignment of interests. It must be emphasized that there
is nothing whatever in the structure of liberal democratic politics that
has any built-in tendency to ensure that the interests of all will be taken
into account or that the demands of social justice will be met. If
anything, the opposite is true: the surest way for a politician to maintain
power in a democracy is to find some way of dividing the electorate into
two unequally sized parts and identify with the majority. In the longer
term, this process is liable to become one of self-reinforcing antagonism
that leads to resistance and to repression in response, and ultimately
threatens the survival of democratic institutions. This is why liberal
democracy is such a rare phenomenon.16
The significance of social isolation in all this is simply that the lack
of empathy between the majority and socially isolated minorities makes
it easier for ambitious politicians to advance their careers by
                                           
16 ‘What is ordinarily thought of as ordinary democracy is inadequate in
societies in which Group A, with 60 per cent of the seats, can, under most
democratic systems, shut out Group B, with 40 per cent. In such conditions,
democracy is more the problem than the answer to a problem.’ Donald L
Horowitz, ‘Self-Determination: Politics, philosophy and law’, pp.421-63 in
Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York:
New York University Press, 1997), NOMOS XXXIX, pp.450-1.
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demonizing and ultimately dehumanizing these minorities. The lethal
potential of this process has been illustrated only too many times in the
twentieth century. The social isolation of any group makes the
incorporation of its interests into political programmes more
problematic. This is true for voluntary isolation as well as for isolation
that is forced on a group. However, social exclusion is more dangerous,
simply because the processes that underlie social exclusion are
frequently the same as those that lead to stigmatization.
I am especially concerned in this paper with stratified social
exclusion. The application of what has been said so far to this is
straightforward. The dynamics of electoral competition in a society that
is stratified along socio-economic lines (rather than being divided
primarily along lines of ethnic or other communalistic conflict) drive
political parties to compete for the ‘middle ground’. This means that the
perceived interests - or, more broadly, concerns - of the median voter
will be close to the position of the majority party, if there is one. In a
multiparty system, it will be close to the position of the median party,
which will have a very strong position in any process of coalition
formation, because it will have to be included in any majority of
ideologically contiguous parties. Everything therefore turns on the
concerns of the median voter.
What has been said so far suggests that the more attenuated the
bonds of social solidarity become, the less inclusive the concerns of the
median voter will be. The socially excluded will thus be failed by
democratic politics. To the extent that the median voter pays attention to
those below the lower threshold of social exclusion it is liable to be in
their capacity as threats to his or her prosperity and personal safety. The
result - most clearly evident in the USA but with Britain tagging along -
is an increasing resort to coercion, in the forms of ‘workfare’ and a more
and more extensive use of the criminal law as an instrument of social
control.17
V Conclusion: Social exclusion and the distribution of
income
The argument of this paper has been that social exclusion is a
phenomenon distinct from poverty and also distinct from economic
                                           
17 See Jordan, chapter 6 (pp.189-221) on ‘The politics of enforcement’.
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inequality. Nevertheless, there is an association between the dispersion
of incomes and social exclusion, but it is not a straightforward one
because the relationship is mediated by the experience of common fate,
through the sharing of common institutions. The significance of
personal income for the capacity to share in common institutions
depends on the accessibility of those institutions to all on a free or
heavily subsidized basis. Thus, to take a simple but often overlooked
illustration, in a society in which much of life is lived in outdoor public
spaces - squares and parks, for example - social isolation will be less
than it would be if everything else were the same but the climate and
social mores were not conducive to outdoor living.
Schools and health services that are free to all users similarly make
personal income levels less important, provided their quality is uniform
and high enough to make the free institutions the ones that are used by
the vast majority of the population. The importance of public transport
in this context can scarcely be exaggerated. As a way of making it true
that there is ‘no such thing as society’ (in the sense of solidarity) the
promotion of the private car at the expense of public transport could
scarcely be improved upon. The private car is an enemy of solidarity as
much as public transport is its friend. The private car isolates people
and puts them in a condition of competition with other road users
(including pedestrians) at any rate where traffic is congested, as in
almost all urban areas. As congestion gets worse, standards of civility
decline: it is noticeable, for example, how much more reluctant car
drivers now are to stop for pedestrians in London, in comparison with
only ten years ago. ‘Road rage’ has become a recognized pathology of
drivers and it is impossible to believe that the deterioration of social
relations on the road does not have any spillover into the rest of life.
Conversely public transport is the most effective way there is of
creating conditions of common fate. (It is no accident that the standard
metaphor for common fate is ‘all in the same boat’.) Most public services
allow some room for manoeuvre: the ‘sharp elbows of the middle
classes’, their knowhow and self-confidence in dealing with
bureaucracies, may be able to come into play to secure advantages
within a public system of health care and education, for example. But
public transport is the great leveller. Even where (as with some trains
and planes) those who can afford it can travel first class, they still have
to go on the same vehicle as the hoi polloi. If the service is unreliable,
they suffer along with everybody else.
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All this means that there is no universally valid generalization to
be sought: the relation of social exclusion to the distribution of income
will depend on the way in which institutions are set up. However, there
are, in societies such as our own, obvious material conditions that have
to be satisfied to avoid social exclusion. The most basic is a place to live:
those with ‘no fixed abode’ (whether sleeping rough or moving between
shelters and hostels) are excluded from most forms of participation,
including all those elementary social processes that require a mailing
address. For many purposes, a mailing address needs to be
supplemented by a telephone, as Tony Atkinson has recently
emphasized: ‘A person unable to afford a telephone finds it difficult to
participate in a society where a majority do not have telephones.
Children are not invited out to play because neighbours no longer call
round - they call up. Letters do not allow the same contact with relatives
who have moved away. A person applying for a job may not be called
for an interview since he or she cannot be contacted directly.’18
But much more is required as the material basis for full
participation in the life of one’s society. To go out in public so as to take
part in social and political events, it is necessary to be respectably
clothed, by the prevailing standards in one’s society; to have access to
good public transport, and otherwise (as on some isolated housing
estates) the price of a taxi or the money to run a car; to be able to return
hospitality, buy a round of drinks or a meal out, and so on. Similarly, to
be able to get and hold a job, it is necessary to be respectably clothed
and to have access to some reliable means of transport to the place of
work.19 Widely used indexes of ‘poverty’ take it as being represented by
an income half that of the median. It seems plausible that something like
this income is also necessary for full participation.
What about the upper threshold of social exclusion? If we assume
that a liberal society cannot actually prohibit people from opting out of
common services such as the public school system or the national health
service, the upper bound on incomes is whatever level makes it
financially feasible and (in relation to alternative uses of the money)
                                           
18 Tony Atkinson, ‘Social exclusion, poverty and unemployment’, pp.1-20 in A
B Atkinson and John Hills (eds.), Exclusion, Employment and Opportunity,
CASEpaper 4, p.14 (London School of Economics).
19 Atkinson points out (ibid., p.15) that ‘to compete for a job, it is today not
enough “to avoid being shabby”, which was the criterion applied by Seebohn
Rowntree in 1899’.
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attractive to opt out. This depends on two factors, both of which can be
manipulated by a government determined to ensure the conditions of
social solidarity. The first is the quality of the public services. Obviously,
the higher the quality (and therefore the more expensive) the public
provision, the more it will cost to improve on it by going into the private
sector. A wider disparity of incomes can therefore be tolerated (other
things being equal), the higher the quality of public services. But in
practice, of course, the high rates of taxation necessary to finance high
quality public services are themselves unlikely (as in Scandinavia) to
leave many people with enough disposable income to enable them to do
better privately.
This is the demand side of the equation. Public policy can also
influence the supply side. So, for any given quality of the service
provided publicly, it is possible to make it more or less expensive to
obtain a significantly superior quality privately. For example, private
schools may or may not be given charitable status: if they are, that is in
effect a gift from everybody else to those who opt out of the public
system, and a society committed the pursuit of solidarity would not
make such a gift.20 This is not a question of discriminating against the
private sector, but merely not discriminating in favour of it. Again,
consider the stipulation in the Canadian health care system that
employees have to be either entirely in or entirely out of it. Since this
would rule out the British practice of moonlighting by consultants who
are already in receipt of an almost full time salary from the National
Health Service, it would make it more expensive to run a private system
of health care along with the public one. The Canadian experience
suggests that a high quality health care system with this proviso built
into it can virtually drive out private alternatives.
Despite all these complexities, let me hazard a guess that,
provided the quality of public service reaches at least tolerable levels,
those with incomes up to three times the median will give priority to the
purchase of superior versions of the private goods that are within reach
of those with an income around the median: a bigger house in a more
desirable neighbourhood, a fancier car, longer or more frequent
holidays in more exotic locations, and so on. Unless public services are
so deplorable that anybody who could possibly afford it would escape
                                           
20 It has been estimated that tax relief on investment income amounts to more
per head of a pupil at Eton than the average amount spent on a pupil at a
state school.
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them, it is only at some level above three times the median income that
opting out of the common institutions will begin to look attractive. If
this is so, it follows that social solidarity can be maintained (so long as
the quality of public services meet the minimum conditions I have
stated) provided that the ratio of the top income to the bottom income in
the society does not exceed six to one.21 We are not, however, dealing
here with an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Social solidarity may be able
to survive a small minority rich enough to opt out of common
institutions. Thus, Swedish social solidarity during the most egalitarian
period was not apparently undermined by the existence of a few very
wealthy families which owned a large part of Swedish industry.
The upshot of this paper is that a government professing itself
concerned with social exclusion but indifferent to inequality is, to put it
charitably, suffering from a certain amount of confusion. It is true, as I
have emphasized, that public policy can make a difference to the impact
that any given degree of inequality has on the extent and severity of
social exclusion. Nevertheless, in any society in which the great bulk of
goods and services are allocated through the market, and in which even
those provided publicly can also be bought privately, there must be a
close connection between inequality and social exclusion.
                                           
21 David Miller has speculated that a spread of eight to one is the maximum
compatible with what he calls social equality, a concept which is in essentials
the same as what I have called social solidarity. David Miller, ‘What kind of
equality should the Left pursue?’, pp.83-99 in Jane Franklin (ed.), Equality
(London: IPPR, 1997), p.97.
